The Board of Editors is pleased to present Issue 3 of the 2014 Volume of the Illinois Law Review.
First, Professor Geis provides insight into the functionality of third-party beneficiaries in contract law. He argues that a mindful promisor should be able to recruit a willing counterparty to make a binding gift promise in any context. It demonstrates this third-party beneficiary technique, evaluates the implications for the borders of contract law, and concludes that vested third-party beneficiary rights are a feasible (though unexpected) device for moving gift promises comfortably in-to the realm of contract law.
Next, Professor Grewal suggests that tax refund determinations by the Joint Committee on Taxation raises separation of power issues. This Article argues that the absence of a statutory veto does not
automatically validate the JCT refund review function, and that § 6405(a)’s thirty-day holding period instead violates the separation of powers.
Third, Professor Rosen challenges existing frameworks by arguing that that religious institutions cannot be reduced to the individuals who compose them, but instead that the protections they deserve may be “greater than the sum of the parts” of their constituent members. To reach this conclusion Professor Rosen applies the Religious Institution Principle.
Next, Professor Hyman examines the potential oversights made by elite legal academics when dismissing the notion that the Affordable Care Act might be unconstitutional. After considering three possible defenses/justifications, this Article identifies five factors that help explain the erroneous predictions of our nation’s elite law professors,who were badly wrong, but never in doubt.
In this Issue’s final article, Professor Laycock examines the ever present relationship between religious liberty and culture wars. The Article argues that we can and should protect the liberty of both sides in the culture wars; that conservative churches would do well to concede the liberty of the other side, including on same-sex marriage, and concentrate on defending their own liberty as conscien-tious objectors; and similarly, that supporters of rights to abortion, contraception, gay rights, and same-sex marriage would do well to concentrate on securing their own rights and to concede that consci-entious objectors should rarely be required to support or facilitate practices they view as evil.